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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
!-iTATB OF UTAH, by and through 
its Road Commission, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
- vs. -
BETTILYON'S, INC., and NOLAN 
OSWALD, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
10277 
Petition for Rehearing 
TO THB HOXORABLI<J MEMBERS OF THE 
SFPR~J'IIE COURT OF UTAH: 
DPfonclants-Amwllants respectfully move the Court, 
pursuant to Ruh' 7G(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
e1·1lnrt\ to grant a rehearing in the above entitled cause 
and upon a reconsideration and rehearing to modify its 
prior decision herein. 
The d<'eision should be reconsidered and a rehearing 
granted for the reason that the decision does not resolve 
the issue raised by appellants and it fails to reflect 
th1~ C'onrt's eonsid0ration of the deprivation of appellants' 
property without due process of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON & BETTIL YON 
VERDEN E. BETTIL YON 
F. BURTON HOWARD 
Attorneys for Appellants 
___,,, 
I 
Brief in Support of Petition 
for Rehearing 
PRELil\IIN ARY S 'l'A TEMENT 
'J'he decision heretofore rendered hy this Court driP> 
not dispose of the major contention of appl'llants herein. 
The Court will recall the following essential facts: 
1. Appellants purchased thirty-six (3G) acres in 
1939. 
2. The Salt Lake County Planning Commission i11 
1961, on request of the Road Commission, acted so ao 
to restrict development of this entire tract. 
3. In 1963 the 1-:'tah State Road Cmmnission in,ii-
tuted an action to condemn about twPlve ( 12) aC'rn' 11f 
this tract. 
4. Appellants were awarded damages for tliis latter 
taking in the sum of $130,000.00. 
Appellants contended on appeal and below that the 
1961 action constituted a compensible taking and asked 
for interest on the amount of the 1963 award from the 
date of the 1961 taking as the measure of damages for 
the 1961 taking. 
This Court, relying on State v. Peek, 1 Utah 2cl 2fi3, 
265 P.2d 630, ruled that the rneasurP of compensation of 
land actually taken is the market valuP of the land nu 
the date of the taking. It further ruled that interest onl)' 
accrues from the time of the actual taking of possession. 
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Ho11·evc>r, the decision di cl not dispose of appellants' 
conli'ntion that a eornpensihle taking occurred in 1961. 
Ewn though appellants may have suggested the wrong 
uwa:rnn• of damages for this taking this does not alter 
the fact that there has been a compensible taking. The 
l'ourt has not ruled on this contention and for this reason 
11 pp1•llar1ts request further consideration of the matter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE 1961 ACTION OF THE STATE ROAD 
CO:\Il\IISSION CONSTITUTED A TAKING WITHIN 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE 14th AMENDMENT TO 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SEC. 22 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
It should be noted that appellants acknowledge a 
taking of their property arising out of the condemnation 
action cmmiH•nced by respondents in July of 1963. This 
adiun l't'snltPd in a taking of twelve (12) acres more or 
],,,s for 1d1ich appellants have received compensation. 
Ho\\'ever, there was a prior taking which is not dis-
rn:-;'led in the Court's opinion herein and for which ap-
prl!ants liave received no compensation. 
'l'o the Pxtent that appellants' property was taken 
1rithout rnmpensation appellants have been damaged. 
Appl'llants re1wat that they have received no compen-
'atio11 from this taking and allege that to deny them 
1·ornp<>n:mtion is to deprive them of property without due 
l11'01·1•ss of law within the provisions of the 14th Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, Section 
22 of the Utah Constitution. 
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0 dispose of this ap1wal the Court must <lPtermin' 
whether or not this first alleged taking was indeed ,
1 
taking compensible under the above cited constitutional 
provisions. This has not been done. Assurancps hv fp. 
spondent, not withstanding, the question raised }1y. thi.< 
petition has not been the subject of previous cMe1:rninn. 
tion by this Court. 
Article T, Section 22 of the etah Constitution Jir11. 
vi des that: 
"Private propl•rty shall not lw talZP11 or dmn. 
aged for public use without just cornpc•nsation.'' 
The 1-ith Amendment to the Fnited States Constitn 
tion is of similar import. In pertinent part it pro,·irh: 
" ... No state shall make or enforcP an~· la11 
which shall abridge the privileges or imrnuniti"' 
of citizens of the United States; nor sha11 an\ 
state deprive any person of life, liberty or Jll'li[i· 
erty without due process of law .. .'' 
Thus if there has been a taking of amwllants' prop· 
Prty for public purposes, then compensation must he pai1l 
therefore. Appellants submit that tht>re has been su('h 11 
taking and that this taking occurred in 1961. The quPi· 
tion to be disposed of is whether there has been such 
a taking. 
Tht> respondent suggests that under the laws olTtali 
there can be no taking unless there has been an entry ur 
· · t · for occupation by the condemmng body. As authon ~ 
0 
this proposition it cites State of Utah v. Peek, 1 Utah ~d 
4 
l 
21i:), ~lifi P.2d 630 and Orrgon Shortlinc R. Co. v. Jones, 
29 rtah 147, 80 Pac. 732. (See RPspondent's Brief, pp. 
11-1.J-.) 
Tlw Court's decision seems to approve of this con-
tr,ntion. Hm\-ever, on page 13 of its Brief, respondent 
r'nncedes the issue in the Jon rs case was not whether 
tl1r'l'' \1-as a taking, but at what point did the taking occur. 
Jn this case the question is whether or not there was 
a tabng and appellants contend there was in 1961 even 
though no physical entry \ms ever made on the propeTty 
'o taken. The entry which was made on part of the 
111·0JH'l't,\- was pursuant to another and subsequent taking. 
It is well established that any substantial interfer-
' 11~e \rith private property which lessens its value, or 
which changes an owner's right to its use in any substan-
tial degree, is a taking, even where the physical possession 
of the mrnn is undisturbed. Nichols on Eminent Domain, 
\"ol. 2, ~fi.:3; State v. District Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 
,ill~; Stockdale v. The Rio Grande Western Railway Com-
pr111y, :2S utah 201, 77 Pac. 849; Lund v. Salt Lake County, 
:1s rtah 54fi, 200 Pac. 510. 
'iYhat are the evidences of this alleged taking? It is 
a matkr of record that appellants' entire tract was effec-
tively n•ndered unusable by the action of the Planning 
l'imunission on J anuarv 10 1961. This was done at the . ' 
rerptPl't of RPspondent as authorized by Salt Lake County 
(Jrdiuance. ~'he effect of this was to prevent appellants 
from changing the use, improving or selling, not only the 
t\\'elw aeres for which they have received compensation 
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hut th<.'il' remaining twent>·-four ( 2-t) acres as ·well. EYi 
dence as to resulting damage was proffrred !mt exclurk·J 
by the 11 rial Court. 
ApJlellants suggest that damages to this portion of 
their property resulted when respondents caused its 
market value to so drop down and its sale to be re-
stricted. Ap1wllants wPre also forced to pay tax<', and 
other assessments on this twenty-four (2-1:) aeres ,,·Jiicii 
were frozen in an unproductive state. This interf(•rrnrP 
with appellants' prop(~rt~- constitutc>d a taking ll'itl1i 11 
both the Utah and Federal constitutions for which ap-
pellants must receive compensation. 
"\Vhile appellants conct·de the pow0r of the Statr· ti 
restrict development as to minimize damages the)' do n11t 
concede the right to restrict developmrnt of thirt.1· .. ,~i 
acres of land so as to minimize damage to a substanlialh 
smaller portion, which is thP subj0ct of a conkmplatf'd 
condemnation action. 
CON'CLUSION' 
·where propPrty is made !C'ss valuable, ]Pss wel'ul 
or less desirablP, hy a taking, n'gardlPss of \\·hether tlim 
has been a physieal taking, compensation is due to the 
owners of the property. Even though appPllants pos~ihh 
mav have misconstrued their remedv insofar as the lll1'8'· 
ure. of damagrs for which tlw taking· hen•in 11wntioHPd 
is concerned, this does not 1wgate the fact that apvl-
1 · · f' · ,,. hirh lants have been damaged. There was a ta ong 01 
no compensation has her~n paid. To this extent appC'llant' 
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Jww ]w('n damaged and to the extent that the Court's 
dl'e1.~ion lwrein fails to dispose of the question of whether 
or not therP has been a taking, appellants have been de-
priYed of property without due process of the law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON & BETTIL YON 
VERDEN E. BET'l'ILYON 
F. BURTON HOW ARD 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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